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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Utah’s Wasatch Front currently faces a 43% chance of experiencing a (magnitude)
M6.75+ earthquake within the next 50 years. It is also one of the fastest growing regions in
the country, which implies that an earthquake in the region could have a devastating effect
on not only the regional economy, but also that of the state and the nation. While there
have been recent efforts to estimate the potential impact of a catastrophic event on the
region, these efforts have focused on direct losses from the disaster (such as extent of
road damage). What is still required is an understanding of the indirect losses that may
result from these direct impacts (such as economic loss due to road damage). Particularly
missing are analytical techniques that can help public-sector organizations better
understand the cascading effects of infrastructure loss on supply chains within their
region. Existing supply chain analysis techniques commonly use complex stochastic
models that are not easily accessible to planners and policymakers and are usually not
directed at their use. What is needed are low-cost analytical techniques that can help
public-sector organizations to assess the potential indirect losses emanating from damage
to physical infrastructure, and that can help prioritize action in the face of limited
resources.
Current literature on supply management also falls short on understanding and explaining
behaviors of small businesses in response to supply chain disruptions. Small businesses
are highly vulnerable to impact from disasters, but are also likely to be slowest to adopt
mitigation and preparedness measures. There is a need for research that examines how
small businesses prepare for and respond to disasters, and how they currently manage
supply chain disruptions. Knowledge on both these issues, namely, the extent of
economic impact on industrial sectors and the extent of disaster preparedness and
resilience within these sectors, are likely to help Utah officials make better decisions about
resilience-focused investments. The low-cost and replicable methodologies developed
here also provide a framework for other at-risk communities to assess their own risk and
make their own resilience investment decisions.
To this end, this study uses a collaborative university-community partnership model to
answer these two questions: (i) what would be the local economic impact of transportation
disruptions due to a potential earthquake in the Wasatch Front? and (ii) what actions were
taken by local businesses to manage these economic impacts and how has it affected
their preparedness for future earthquakes? The study framework prioritizes use of
common public-sector organizations (namely, emergency management agencies,
metropolitan planning organizations, local universities, and Associations of Business and
Economic Research or AUBER organizations) and easily available data and software
(namely, Hazus, Travel Demand Models & REMI PI+) to ensure that similar analysis can
be done in high- as well as low-resource communities.
The first phase of this study combines disaster impact data on the roadways of the
Wasatch Front with travel demand modeling to first estimate truck travel time delays, and
then the annualized cost of this delay to various industries. The study estimates that
disruptions to the road system in the event of an M7.0 earthquake in the Wasatch Front
would likely result in approximately $6 billion damage to the economy through the loss of
6

production. The study also estimates that 10 out of the 20 NAICS industrial sectors will
experience more than $100 million in damage individually, and that this accounts for over
70% of the regional economy. Four of the five industrial sectors with the largest share of
the Wasatch Front economy also feature in the sectors of highest disaster impact. These
findings paint a dire picture of indirect impact due to road system disruptions on the
regional economy, if not the national.
These findings also raise questions about the state of disaster preparedness in the highimpact sectors, and whether the recent experiences with the 2020 March earthquake and
pandemic have built disaster resilience capacity of local businesses. The second phase
of the study used survey methods to record business recovery actions after the March
2020 disasters, with special focus on supply and production issues and institutional
learning for the future. The survey found that businesses were most challenged by
production issues after the disaster events and that they undertook multiple actions,
including diversifying suppliers to within and outside the city, to manage supply
disruptions. Importantly, the disaster experience, while increasing risk awareness among
businesses, had not translated into concrete preparedness or mitigation actions. This
points to broader structural issues that may pose as a barrier to adoption of resilience
business practices within the Utah economy.
Based on the findings of this research, the study suggests the following actions as key to
building future local economic resilience along the Wasatch Front:
•
•
•
•

Increasing pre-disaster investment in resilient transportation infrastructure to
reduce the cost of eventual recovery.
Improving business resilience practices for high-impact industrial sectors through
education and outreach.
Identifying structural barriers to adoption of resilient business and promoting
mitigation through recovery.
Mainstreaming disaster resilience into economic development by breaking the
siloed approach to emergency management and economic development.
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1.0 BACKGROUND AND STUDY OBJECTIVES
In 2015, an earthquake scenario report developed for the Utah Seismic Safety
Commission estimated that the Wasatch Front currently faces a 43% chance of
experiencing a magnitude (M)6.75+ earthquake within the next 50 years. The report also
indicted that the Salt Lake City segment of the Wasatch Fault is overdue for a “Big One”
(an M7.0 event) which last occurred 1,400 years ago. An M7.0 earthquake can produce
double the ground shaking produced by an M6.75 event, which significantly increases risk
to the region.
The 2015 Scenario Report models the potential impact of such an M7.0 earthquake event
in the Salt Lake City segment of the Wasatch Fault. The report estimates that the Wasatch
Front will likely experience a short-term economic loss of $33 billion, including $24.9 billion
in direct buildings-related (capital) loss, $6.9 billion in income loss, and $1.4 billion in
lifeline-related loss which includes transportation facilities. With regards to highways,
railway tracks, road and rail bridges, and the Salt Lake City International Airport—
essential to the region’s supply chains and economic resilience—the report points out that
damage and disruption will be inevitable despite good building practices. This is due to
both natural reasons (lateral ground movement and failures of embankments) as well as
the need for careful inspections of each such facility before it can be reopened to the
public.
The recent March 2020 M5.7 Magna earthquake event (which occurred in the same
region) illustrated this point very well—the airport and multiple highway bridges had to be
closed for many hours owing to inspections and repairs. Such transportation disruptions
have significant consequences for Utah’s economy, but also nationally. A 2020 report
prepared for the Wasatch Front Regional Council states that Utah’s transportation system
carried $279.2 billion worth of goods by all modes combined in 2017 alone. With the new
Inland Port being established in the northwest quadrant of Salt Lake City, one can expect
this number to only grow in the coming years.
The impact of transportation loss, both short- and long-term, could be devastating for an
economy so concentrated in one place and so heavily dependent on our transportation
network. Of particular concern is the impact on small businesses which, according to the
U.S. Small Business Administration, made up around 99% of all businesses in Utah in
2018. Of concern are also minority-owned small businesses which are growing rapidly in
the Wasatch Front (Todd & Voight, 2016), but which are also particularly vulnerable to
disaster impact. The ability of these businesses to prepare for and respond to supply
chain disruptions has direct and significant consequences for the economy of the Wasatch
Front and the state as a whole.
The ongoing Coronavirus pandemic and the 2020 M5.7 Magna earthquake provide an
opportunity to study some of these dynamics in real time. While the pandemic did not
result in transportation loss per se, it has disrupted supply chains around the country and
studying small business response to it can provide critical insights into potential postearthquake responses, and through that, inform pre-earthquake disaster resilience
planning for the region. To this end, this study asks two interrelated questions:
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i.

What would be the local economic impact of transportation disruptions due to a
potential earthquake in the Wasatch Front?

ii.

What actions were taken by local businesses to manage these economic impacts
and how has it affected their preparedness for future earthquakes?

Apart from creating more generalizable knowledge on disaster resilience of small
businesses, this study also develops a collaborative and affordable analytical framework
for planners and policymakers in high hazard-risk areas to use to make data-driven
decisions on transportation and economic resilience planning.
The study methodology consists of two phases. Phase I aims to measure the local
economic impact of disaster-induced transportation disruptions (Q1), while Phase II aims
to identify small business response to these types of disruptions (Q2).

1.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

While supply chain disruptions due to natural and other disasters is frequently studied in
business administration and transportation planning, much less attention has been given
to supply chain disruption as an economic recovery problem with greatest risk to small
businesses. Knowledge on these aspects can help planners and policymakers to promote
effective and equitable pre-event disaster mitigation and preparedness practices for
economic resilience, but also to prioritize investments to mitigate small business impact.
Literature on supply chain disruption can be roughly divided into three categories: (i)
studies that develop novel techniques to model supply chains at the firm-level (see
Hosseini et al., 2019, for a comprehensive review); (ii) studies that examine supply chain
disruption management within the firm (e.g., Wagner & Bode, 2009; Zhao et al., 2020);
and (iii) studies that model supply chain linkages between the firm and its counterparts,
including through transportation systems (e.g., Töyli et al., 2013; Albertzeth, 2020).
Studies focused on supply chain analysis techniques commonly use complex stochastic
models (Hosseini et al., 2019) that are not easily accessible to planners and policymakers,
and, with few exceptions, (see for example, Albertzeth, 2020) are not directed at their use.
Supply chain management studies also, by and large, use secondary data (Kull et al.,
2018) which precludes a nuanced understanding of business-level behaviors. These are
better assessed through primary data collection such as surveys. This literature is also
“firm-focused” (Kull et al., 2018, p.28)—that is, focused on improving business practices—
which diminishes its utility for planners and policymakers who must conceptualize supply
chains within the broader economic context and whose interventions are policy-based,
applied areawide, and largely strategic given financial constraints.
The current literature on supply management also falls short in another aspect: behaviors
of small businesses in response to supply chain disruptions (Kull et al., 2018). Postdisaster supply chain disruptions are more likely to adversely impact small businesses
because they are typically less resourced; have higher rates of minority ownership than
other size businesses (Marshall & Shrank, 2014; SBA, 2019); are limited in their ability to
develop alternative supply streams (Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008); and have higher
transaction costs due to lower bargaining power and reputation (e.g., Arend & Wisner,
2005). Disaster studies have also shown that small businesses take fewer mitigative
9

actions against disasters and are generally less prepared for such events (Josephson et
al., 2017). Lastly, small businesses not only have fewer programmatic options for postdisaster aid, but these programs often require significant and tedious paperwork that acts
as a barrier to their participation (Xiao & Van Zandt, 2012; Furlong & Scheberle, 1998).
Adverse disaster impact on small and locally owned businesses, in turn, has lasting
consequences for the post-disaster recovery of the broader community at large (Xiao &
Van Zandt, 2012; Xiao et al., 2018). Small businesses are key social actors in their
community, not just economic ones, and often play a role in placemaking at the
neighborhood level as well as overall neighborhood recovery (Xiao et al, 2018). Despite
their significance to community-level resilience, empirical research on small businesses
recovery is lacking in both disaster studies literature (Marshall & Shrank, 2014) and that
on supply management (Krull et al., 2018).
This study addresses existing literature gaps by: (i) using easily accessible and primary
data methods to assess potential local economic impact of transportation-dependent small
businesses in the event of an earthquake; and (ii) overall preparedness of small and
medium enterprises in managing such disruptions in the future. In contrast to other studies
that focus only on disaster vulnerability, this study also focuses on coping and adaptation
behaviors of small businesses, which accounts for their own agency in supply
management and is a generally more empowering perspective on resilience planning.
This type of nuanced approach can provide planners and policymakers with a clearer
understanding of where resilience-building policy,
planning and infrastructural interventions are
needed the most, to what extent, and to what
effect.

1.2

METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

The study was conducted in two interlinked
phases using a mixed method approach. Phase I
involved integrating results from three popularly
used models (Hazus, the Wasatch Front Travel
Demand Model, and REMI PI+) to identify
industrial sectors expected to be most impacted
by transportation loss in a M7.0 earthquake
scenario within the Wasatch Front (i.e., Box Elder,
Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake, Tooele, and Weber
counties). The study obtained results of a 2019
Hazus analysis of an M7.0 earthquake event in
the Wasatch Front from the Utah Division of
Emergency Management and used it to identify
recovery status of road and bridge networks at
Days 1, 14 and 30. These results were then
inputted into the Wasatch Front Travel Demand
Model to estimate travel delays caused by these
for Day 30 and, finally, the REMI PI+ model was
Figure 1.1. Map of Study Area for Phase I
used to estimate the annualized economic impact (five county area, marked in dark blue)
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of these travel disruptions to industrial sectors. Chapter 2 presents each of these
analytical stages in detail.
Phase II of the study involved a random sample telephone and online survey of 130 Salt
Lake City businesses from within the high-impact sectors identified during Phase I.
Businesses were sampled using the Mergent Intellect database, available through the
University of Utah library system, and stratified for the North American Industry
Classification Manual-United States (NAICS) industrial sector and size. Only the top 10
worst-affected industrial sectors identified through Phase I were surveyed. The survey
assessed the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic and M5.7 Magna earthquake on
business operations; actions taken to manage supply and service disruptions and other
recovery actions; recovery status; level of awareness of earthquake risk in the region; and
their interactions with disaster preparedness and planning resources at the county, state
and federal level. Survey methods and results are described in Chapter 3.
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2.0 PHASE I: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISASTER-INDUCED
TRANSPORTATION DISRUPTIONS
2.1

EXPLANATION OF SOFTWARES AND MODELS

The study used three specific software to conduct this exercise, namely, Hazus, Wasatch
Front Travel Demand Model (WF-TDM), and REMI PI+. Hazus, developed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the National Institute of Building Sciences, is a
natural hazards loss estimation software developed at the national level. The model is
commonly used by state and local governments to estimate regional-level economic, life,
building, and lifeline losses and to model shelter, debris removal, and essential service
needs after multiple types of disasters (including earthquakes). The program uses multiple
default databases for general building stock (including construction type and occupancy
classes); facility information for select lifeline and essential facilities (including
transportation facilities); and, in the case of earthquakes, fault structures and ways to
predict ground motion. Hazus contains baseline inventories for the entire country available
to download through the FEMA Map Center Service website. The program can be
customized to include region-specific data to improve accuracy of loss estimation.
Wasatch Front Travel Demand Model (WF-TDM), developed by the Wasatch Front
Regional Council, is a modified four-step travel model that uses a travel time feedback
loop to evaluate roadway congestion costs. Travel demand models are commonly used by
regional governments to assess and predict travel behaviors within the region. The WFTDM calculates roadway volumes, travel speed indicators, transit route boardings, and
regional statistics including vehicle miles traveled (VMT), vehicle hours traveled (VHT),
transit/auto/non-motorized mode shares, and trip length costs. The model includes current
regional roadway and transit projects listed in the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) and
the official traffic analysis zone (TAZ)-level socioeconomic forecasts for the Wasatch Front
Region. The model’s parameters are calibrated to reflect local travel behavior patterns
reported in the Utah Travel Study household survey and the model’s results are validated
with observed travel conditions for the model’s base year, 2015.
REMI PI+, developed by Regional Economic Models, Inc., is a dynamic, multiregional
simulation model that forecasts economic, population and labor market impacts for many
years into the future. The REMI PI+ is similar to many economic analysis models used by
states and regions across the nation for their own economic development planning. REMI
provides year-by-year estimates of the regional effects of specific economic or policy
changes. The model incorporates input-output relationships, general equilibrium effects,
econometric relationships, and economic geography effects. Although REMI has many
complex, interrelated submodels and features, the essential logic of the model derives
from the economic base, input-output, and cohort component submodels. The REMI
model connects these submodels through labor, capital, financial, and product markets. It
simulates the size and composition of the economy and population over time. For
example, if there is an increase in the production of an export base industry to the region,
the region’s employment and income increase as well.
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2.2

TASKS AND METHODOLOGY (PHASE I)

Phase I of this study assesses potential economic impact of an M7.0 earthquake event in
the Wasatch Front. The phase involved three main research tasks: (1) assessing potential
damage state and recovery functions for roadways and bridges using Hazus; (2) analyzing
travel time delay for trucks based on estimated damage level; and (3) annualizing
economic cost to various industrial sectors based on estimated truck travel time delay.
Each of these stages of analysis are described below.
The analytical framework presented here was carefully designed to be replicable and
transferable to other communities. Since much of mitigation funding is disbursed postevent (to mitigate against future events), this puts communities which are at risk but have
not yet experienced the event at a major disadvantage. The university-community
partnership model that this study is based on provides a relatively inexpensive path for atrisk communities to create the planning support needed for mitigation action at the
regional and business-level. While this study and framework were focused on
transportation-related impacts, such a university-community partnership, with appropriate
selection of team members and models, could easily be applied to topics such as postdisaster impacts on housing, power or water infrastructure, or population displacement.

2.2.1 Assessing damage state and recovery function
This study uses results from a 2020 Hazus analysis of an M7.0 earthquake for the Salt
Lake City segment of the Wasatch Fault provided by the Utah Division of Emergency
Management (DEM). The Hazus analysis required updating baseline inventory for
highway segments (see Appendix A) because roadways (unlike railroads) are not typically
included in the Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data (HIFLD), which is the
traditional source for baseline data in Hazus. Updated data on bridge fragility assessment
could have improved the Hazus analysis further; however. it was unavailable for this
study.
Hazus produces two types of data that are relevant to this study. First is damage state,
which is classified into five categories (None, Slight, Moderate, Extensive, and Complete),
and the second is a discrete restoration function (Functional Percentage) for days 1, 3, 7,
14, 30 and 90 past the disaster event. These are produced for every road, rail and air
segment, bridge, and facility and are produced as GIS datasets (GIS shapefiles). This
study uses the functionality/restoration function to represent system impact instead of the
damage function because recovery function better indicates a system’s ability to continue
operations in the event of a disaster and because of easier fit with WF-TDM model, which
can more readily interpret and integrate reduced system functionality.
For non-highway bridges, functionality of the road links going through it or under it were
assumed to be the same as the bridge. For highway bridges, functionality of the road link
going through the bridge was assumed to be the same as the bridge, but the road link
going under the bridge was assumed to remain unaffected due to the possibility of rerouting that traffic and the priority given to highways for debris clearance.
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Based on these assumptions, we extracted Hazus results data for highway (roads)
segments and bridges for the six-county region under jurisdiction of the Wasatch Front
Regional Council (Box Elder, Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake, Tooele, and Weber). This step
ensured that the Hazus analysis was coterminous with the second stage WF-TDM
analysis. This study did not analyze the impact of rail and air transportation disruptions
because the WF-TDM does not support traffic demand analysis for the railway or air
systems, which limits the study’s ability to estimate travel delays by these modes. This
data was then reconciled with and inputted into the WF-TDM in the next step.

2.2.2 Forecasting delay in vehicle hours traveled
For this study, the Wasatch Front Regional Council calculated travel time delays using the
WF-TDM based on the restoration function for Days 1 and 30. These specific timelines
were chosen based on typical definitions of response and recovery phases as used by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). According to the 2019 National
Response Framework, “short-term response” begins immediately after a disaster event
and lasts for “a few weeks.” On the other hand, FEMA’s 2017 Pre-Disaster Recovery
Planning Guide for Local Governments and the 2015 Planning for Post-Disaster
Recovery: Next Generation (PAS Report 576) of the American Planning Association both
cite “recovery” as starting approximately one month (30 days) after the disaster.
The study analyzed two scenarios using the Wasatch Front Travel Demand Model (WFTDM), Version 8.3.1 released August 2020. The model was run for the year 2019. The first
run assumed the network functionality and accompanying decrease in allowable road
capacity (based on Hazus-generated functionality/restoration function) that would occur on
Day 1 after a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. The second run assumed the same but for 30
days out from the event. Table 2.1 shows the forecasted delay in vehicle hours traveled
for Day 1 and Day 30 scenarios for all vehicle modes and trucks, specifically because
these are common modes of road-based transportation of supply goods.
Table 2.1. Delay in Vehicle Hours Traveled based on Day 1 and Day 30 Functionality
Delay in Vehicle Hours Traveled
Delay in Vehicle Hours Traveled
(All Vehicles)
(Trucks)
Base
Day 1
Day 30
Base
Day 1
Day 30
Region
136,500
234,100
192,300
21,100
39,300
32,000
Box Elder
100
100
100
<100
<100
<100
Davis
20,000
26,400
22,600
3,000
3,800
3,400
Salt Lake
86,900
174,400
138,000
13,500
29,900
23,400
Weber
8,000
8,800
8,400
1,300
1,500
1,400
Utah
21,400
24,300
23,000
3,300
4,000
3,700
Source: Wasatch Front Regional Council analysis using the WF-TDM
2019

2.2.2.1

Geoprocessing in preparation for modeling

To evaluate the traffic delay costs, it was necessary to transfer the Hazus Day 1
and Day 30 damage-level estimates onto the road network links that represent
the transportation system in the TDM (TDM Master Network). Both data are
represented as GIS features, but geometry and attribute structures are quite
different. Hazus damage estimates were provided in a highway segments file
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while the WF-TDM master network is exported as a geodatabase file. These two
files did not have a common unique identifier that could be used to match
geographic features and relate their attribute values across the respective
datasets. To transfer the Hazus Days 1 and 30 fields and values from the Hazus
Highway Segment file to the TDM Master Network file required some data
preparation work using spatial and table joins on query-based subsets of the
datasets. This work is detailed below.
Roadways: Since there was no field available to join the highway segment
shapefile with the master network, a series of spatial joins needed to take place.
To do so, we utilized a custom tool called “Transfer Fields” separately for
freeways, arterials, and ramps utilizing queries shown in Appendix A Figure 1
and Table 1. These geo-processed files were transferred back to the TDM
Master Network file, which also transferred the needed attribute values for most
of the road links. However, there were still several links that were in the WF-TDM
master network that were not represented in the Hazus highway segment file, but
which also needed a restoration function for Days 1 and 30. We used the query
shown in Appendix A Table 2 to first flag these roadway links. Then, we used the
Thiessen Polygon tool to spatially join the two road feature layers. This involved
creating midpoints on the remaining links utilizing the Feature Vertices To Points
tool and using those midpoints to run the Create Thiessen Polygon tool. Then,
we spatially joined the Thiessen Polygons with the remaining links and assigned
them functionality values for Days 1 and 30. This concluded the work necessary
to transfer the Days 1 and 30 restoration function fields from the Hazus Highway
Segments to the WF-TDM Master Network.
Bridges: Bridges overpassing other roadways presented an additional challenge
as there is no standard way to differentiate a road link in the TDM master network
that is a bridge versus one that runs under a bridge. For this, we needed to
manually transfer the Days 1 and 30 restoration function values from the Hazus
Highway Bridge shapefile to the TDM Master Network file. Attempts to separate
out the arterials from the freeways and use the attribute transfer tool to transfer
this data proved to be ineffective. The manual transfer process was extremely
time consuming, which severely limited the study’s ability to conduct more TDM
runs for other restoration timelines provided by Hazus (Days 3, 7, 14 and 90),
which, in turn, affects the accuracy of the annualization of truck delays as
described in Section 2.2.3.1.

2.2.3 Estimating supply chain impact due to truck travel delays
2.2.3.1

Annualizing truck delays

We confined our analysis to truck transportation. On average, industries use about
one-fifth as much air transportation as truck transportation and about one-seventh
as much rail transportation.
Using the Hazus-produced functionality/restoration function for Days 1, 3, 7, 14, 30,
and 90, we calculated the average functionality across all segments in a given
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county for each day. This was then subtracted from 100 to obtain the average
percent nonfunctional, then plotted in Excel. We then added trendlines using the
functional form with the highest R2, and projected them out to 365 days (see
Appendix A Figures 2-6). We weighted road and bridge segments equally,
assuming that traffic would be routed around nonfunctional bridges until they were
repaired.
The Wasatch Front travel demand model (WF-TDM) produced the delay vehicle
hours of travel (VHT) for trucks by county on Day 1 and Day 30 of the earthquake.
Since REMI PI+ works in annual increments, we needed to annualize the delays in
each county. To do this, we set the intercept of each county’s recovery curve
equation (provided by Excel) to the Day 1 delay VHT for that county, then used the
equation to estimate the delay VHT on Days 2 through 365. Summing these
provided the total delay for one year (see Appendix A, A.1, 1.1 for technical note).
Having TDM outputs for more than two points would, of course, provide a more
accurate trendline for annualization purposes; but converting HAZUS model
outputs to TDM inputs was time consuming and labor intensive.
In Box Elder and Weber counties, while the damage to roads and bridges is
minor—the average percent nonfunctional on Day 1 is 0.0064% in Box Elder and
0.12% in Weber—the recovery curves never approach zero over the course of the
year. This leads to unreasonably large annual hours of delay, for example, 106% of
average annual VHT in Box Elder. To produce more reasonable results, we forced
the recovery curves for these two counties to go to zero on Day 180, assuming that
roads and bridges would be fully functional by six months after the earthquake (see
Appendix A, A.1, 1.2 for technical note). We then used these modified recovery
curves to annualize the delays in the same manner as the other counties.
The WF-TDM provided average weekday truck VHT, without an earthquake, for
each county. Determining the average work week for truck drivers can be difficult.
There are complex rules governing the number of hours truck drivers may work in a
seven- or eight-day period. However, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020),
transportation and material moving occupations work an average of 39.9 hours per
week. This implies a 260-day work year, which we used to calculate the average
annual truck VHTs for each county.
We then calculated the annualized truck travel delay hours by county as a share of
average annual truck VHT without the effects of an earthquake (see Table 2.2).
This share of normal annual VHT was distributed among industries in each county
according to an industry’s use of truck transportation. The U.S. Bureau of
Transportation Statistics compiles a series of Transportation Satellite Accounts
(TSAs). The direct requirements table in these accounts shows the amount of inhouse and for-hire air, rail, water, and truck transportation services required by
each industry to produce a dollar of output (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.2 Truck VHT Before and After Magnitude 7.0 Earthquake
County
Box Elder

No Earthquake
Average
Average
Weekday VHT
Annual VHT

Day 1
Delay VHT

After Earthquake
Annual
Delay Share of
Delay VHT
Average Year

22

5,724

42

1,298

22.7%

3,067

797,352

3,848

215,406

27.0%

13,458

3,498,988

29,909

1,674,258

47.8%

Utah

3,279

852,566

3,969

304,622

35.7%

Weber

1,266

329,234

1,509

38,209

11.6%

Region

21,092

5,483,863

39,276

2,233,792

40.7%

Davis
Salt Lake

Note: VHT = vehicle hours of travel
Source: Wasatch Front Regional Council travel demand modeling and Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute
analysis of Utah Department of Emergency Management Hazus modeling outputs

Regional Economic Models, Inc.’s 29-county PI+ model for Utah contains baseline
estimates of output by industry in each county. We multiplied baseline industry
output by that industry’s in-house, for-hire, and total trucking direct requirements to
estimate the baseline value of trucking required for each industry in each county—
essentially the demand for or use of trucking by businesses in each county. In a
few cases, REMI industries and TSA industries did not match exactly. We used
national industry output data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to
apportion transportation requirements from the more aggregated TSA sectors to
the less aggregated REMI industries (see Appendix A, A.1, 1.3 for technical note).
To estimate each industry’s share of delays in each county, we multiplied each
county’s total trucking delay (share of normal annual VHT) by each industry’s inhouse trucking requirement as a share of county total baseline trucking
requirements. All for-hire trucking delays were assigned to the transportation
industry, as the provider of for-hire trucking to all other industries. These delay
shares were entered into the REMI PI+ model as a percentage reduction in output
for 19 private, nonfarm industries in each county. The following equation
summarizes the process:
∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐
× 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐

[2 − 1]

where ∆Yic is the percentage reduction in output by industry i in county c, Dc is the
annualized truck delay VHT in county c, Nc is the normal annual truck VHT in
county c, and Uic is industry i’s share of total truck transportation usage in county c.
The REMI PI+ model allocates the transportation sector’s additional delays based
on an input-output matrix that indicates how much for-hire transportation each
industry uses.
We did not try to account for demurrage costs—costs related to the time sensitivity
of the goods being transported. There does not appear to be standard, publicly
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available data on these types of costs. Including these would also require analysis
of what types of goods are being delivered to which local businesses. While
statewide data on the flow of commodities by mode are available from the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s Freight Analysis Framework, county-level data are
not. In addition, assigning commodities to the local industries that use them, as well
as the amounts used, may be beyond the capacity of most local governmental and
planning organizations.
Table 2.3 Use of Truck Transportation by Industry, 2019
(Value of transportation used as a share of industry output)
Industry

In-House

For-Hire

Total

Transportation and warehousing
0.00%
3.75%
3.75%
Construction
1.96%
1.50%
3.46%
Wholesale trade
2.42%
0.20%
2.62%
Manufacturing
0.87%
1.70%
2.57%
Retail trade
2.26%
0.18%
2.45%
Other services, except public administration
2.01%
0.25%
2.26%
Accommodation and food services
1.61%
0.22%
1.83%
Mining
0.75%
0.66%
1.41%
Professional and technical services
1.01%
0.09%
1.10%
Utilities
0.24%
0.79%
1.03%
Health care and social assistance
0.45%
0.17%
0.62%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
0.51%
0.07%
0.58%
Information
0.31%
0.23%
0.54%
Administrative and waste management services
0.48%
0.04%
0.52%
Management of companies and enterprises
0.28%
0.03%
0.30%
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
0.07%
0.06%
0.13%
Real estate and rental and leasing
0.07%
0.02%
0.10%
Educational services
0.07%
0.02%
0.09%
Finance and insurance
0.06%
0.02%
0.07%
Note: The amounts shown are the dollars of truck transportation services used by a given industry
per dollar of that industry’s output, displayed as percentages.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Transportation
Satellite Accounts

2.2.3.2

Supply Chain Impacts

The Gardner Institute used the REMI PI+ model to estimate the negative economic
impacts of a transportation shock caused by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Salt
Lake City. REMI is a dynamic model incorporating input-output, economic
geography, econometric, general equilibrium, and demographic components. The
REMI inputs and results were for the 2019 calendar year. Economic loss was
modeled by assigning a percentage reduction in output for 19 private, nonfarm
industries in each county of the region of study, as described above. The study
region consists of five counties: Box Elder, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, and Weber.
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Table 2.4 Economic Impacts of Transportation Shock, 2019 (Millions of Dollars)
Category
Total Employment
Personal Income
Intermediate Demand*
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Total Impact
-109,517
-$5,982.5
-$5,327.8
-$10,423.3

*Intermediate demand is multiplied by each respective industry’s regional purchase coefficient to
constrain it to impacts within the study region.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model

Table 2.4 summarizes the total loss of employment, personal income, and gross
domestic product (GDP) within the five counties of study. A transportation shock to
Utah’s economy in 2019 would have resulted in about 110,000 fewer jobs, a
reduction of $6.0 billion in personal income, and a $10.4 billion reduction in Utah’s
economic activity. Note that this analysis includes only losses due to transportation
delays. There are other components to consider when estimating the overall loss of
an earthquake, such as structural damage, displaced households, other production
losses not related to transportation, and much more.
Using metrics such as employment, personal income, and GDP gives an overall
view of the total economic impact of a transportation shock. However, these
impacts are insufficient in identifying which industries are most vulnerable to supply
chain disruptions. To do this, we look at the effects of a transportation shock to
intermediate demand, which isolates inter-industry transactions of goods and
services purchased by firms from other firms and used to produce final products.
For example, a manufacturing company may buy copper extracted by the mining
industry and use it to build wind turbines. The output from mining is an input for
manufacturing, which leads to a finished product. While the inputs and outputs
between firms are counted in intermediate demand, final goods and services that
reach the final buyer are counted in final demand. The intermediate business-tobusiness transactions create complex networks that make up the supply chain.
A regional purchase coefficient is the proportion of local industry demand that is
met by local industry supply. To constrain the supply chain impacts to activity within
each county of study, we multiply intermediate demand in each county by each
industry’s regional purchase coefficient. This approach is conservative because we
have no means to capture demand supplied from other counties in the study
region. We obtained regional purchase coefficients by industry from the REMI PI+
model. The following equation summarizes the supply chain impact calculation:
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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[2 − 2]

where SCIic is the supply chain impact on industry i in county c, IDic is the
intermediate demand by industry i in county c, and RPCic is the regional purchase
coefficient for industry i in county c.
In the five-county study region, the loss in intermediate demand for all nonfarm
private industries would have amounted to $5.3 billion (see Table 2.5) in 2019.
Total loss for the top five industries—manufacturing, real estate and rental,
professional and technical services, administrative and waste management
services, and transportation and warehousing—accounted for $3.5 billion (66%) of
the total loss from the simulated transportation shock.
The loss in three sectors—manufacturing, real estate and rental, and professional
and technical services—amounted to nearly 50% of the total loss within the study
region. Manufacturing’s share of the loss was largest at 22.8%, followed by real
estate and rental (13.7%), and professional and technical services (11.6%).
Administrative and waste management services and transportation and
warehousing rounded out the top five, taking a combined 18.4% share of the total.
Each county within the region of study has a unique economy. As such, total loss
and industry sizes vary from county to county (see Appendix A Tables 3-7). Even
with differences in local economies, manufacturing and real estate and rental are
the two hardest-hit sectors for every county within the region of analysis.
Professional and technical services ranks third in Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah
counties, while transportation and warehousing and administrative and waste
management services rank third for Box Elder and Weber counties, respectively.
Manufacturing was the most impacted sector for every county within the study
region. The loss for all five counties was $1.2 billion, representing 23% of the total
loss in intermediate demand. The manufacturing and transportation sectors are
interdependent. The manufacturing industry consistently relies on transportation to
provide its businesses with the raw materials to be transformed into useable
products, and then to ship these intermediate and finished goods to their next or
final destinations. In turn, manufactured goods are the most prominent industry
input for the transportation sector. Manufacturing also has a significant footprint in
every county of the study region. It is Box Elder County’s largest and Weber
County’s second-largest sector.
It may come as a surprise that real estate and rental is second on the list, with
regionwide losses of $730 million, a 14% share of the total loss. Transportation is
not a vital input for the real estate and rental sector, nor is real estate and rental a
very large industry in any of the counties within the study region. However, real
estate and rental is a significant input for the transportation sector. Inputs from real
estate and rental for transportation may include purchasing land for warehouses
and the rental and leasing of storage facilities, vehicles, and commercial
equipment. An earthquake’s effect on reducing transportation’s output, which uses
real estate and rental as a significant input, also has an upstream impact on the
real estate and rental sector itself. Another essential factor contributing to large
losses in real estate and rental is this sector’s regional purchase coefficient relative
to other industries. Real estate and rental’s regional purchase coefficient is
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relatively high compared with other sectors. Depending on the county, 76% to 98%
of real estate and rental products and services are supplied within the local
economy.
Table 2.5 Five-County Intermediate Demand Impacts by Industry, 2019 (Millions of Dollars)
Industry

Change in
Intermediate Demand

Share of
Total

Industry
Size

Manufacturing
-$1,212.1
22.8%
Real estate and rental and leasing
-$729.8
13.7%
Professional and technical services
-$616.1
11.6%
Administrative and waste management services
-$497.4
9.3%
Transportation and warehousing
-$484.8
9.1%
Finance and insurance
-$434.2
8.1%
Wholesale trade
-$401.7
7.5%
Information
-$237.2
4.5%
Retail trade
-$153.0
2.9%
Construction
-$146.2
2.7%
Other services, except public administration
-$120.5
2.3%
Accommodation and food services
-$92.5
1.7%
Mining
-$64.9
1.2%
Utilities
-$49.4
0.9%
Health care and social assistance
-$27.5
0.5%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
-$26.7
0.5%
Management of companies and enterprises
-$21.2
0.4%
Educational services
-$10.6
0.2%
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
-$1.8
0.0%
Total
-$5,327.8
100%
Note: Industry Size represents each industry’s share of total employment in the region.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model

8.1%
6.3%
9.5%
7.0%
4.8%
7.9%
3.5%
2.8%
11.9%
7.3%
5.5%
6.8%
0.4%
0.2%
9.5%
2.4%
1.8%
4.2%
0.1%
100%

Professional and technical services would lose an estimated $616 million (11.6% of
the total) in intermediate demand. The sector is the second largest of all within the
five-county region. This, along with its relatively high regional purchase coefficients
in Salt Lake, Utah, and Davis counties, are the driving factors for the sector
reaching the third spot on the list. Administrative services would shrink by $497
million, 9.3% of the total. Like real estate, administrative services is another
significant input for the transportation sector, and the sector also has a relatively
high regional purchase coefficient.
Transportation and warehousing ranks fifth in terms of the total reduction in
intermediate demand. While transportation is the fifth-largest sector in Box Elder
County, it is less prominent in other study counties with significantly larger
economies. The regional purchase coefficient of the transportation sector is
comparatively lower than other sectors. While these two factors reduce the impacts
on intermediate demand for transportation, the fact that it takes the largest initial hit
(see Table 2.3, above) keeps it in the top five impacted industries.
The last piece of analysis compares the effects of a transportation shock with a “noearthquake” baseline. The baseline represents Utah’s industries operating as they
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normally would within the business cycle. This analysis shifts from comparing the
absolute sizes of supply chain effects across industries, to considering changes
within each sector relative to its size. Table 2.6 shows the percent changes in
intermediate demand from industry baselines for each county in the study region.
These changes do not account for regional purchase coefficients, but instead
represent the change in total intermediate demand facing each industry relative to
baseline levels.
When focusing on within-industry changes from a transportation shock, it is no
surprise that the transportation and warehousing sector has the most considerable
reduction. Several industries are heavily reliant on transportation for the movement
of both inputs and outputs in their supply chains. Companies in retail and wholesale
trade—such as grocery stores and construction equipment dealers—are heavily
reliant on the goods they receive, delivered by the transportation sector.
Transportation is likewise critical for moving raw materials from mining to
manufacturing, and then intermediate and finished goods from manufacturing to
their next destination.
The five industries most impacted by a transportation shock are transportation and
warehousing (–12.3%), retail trade (–12.1%), management of companies and
enterprises (–9.1%), wholesale trade (–9.0%), and mining (–8.8%). When focusing
on within-industry changes from a transportation shock, it is no surprise that the
transportation and warehousing sector has the most considerable reduction.
Several industries are heavily reliant on transportation for the movement of both
inputs and outputs in their supply chains. Companies in retail and wholesale
trade—such as grocery stores and construction equipment dealers—are heavily
reliant on the goods they receive, delivered by the transportation sector.
Transportation is likewise critical for moving raw materials from mining to
manufacturing, and then intermediate and finished goods from manufacturing to
their next destination.
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Table 2.6 Five-County and All-Region Percent Change in Intermediate Demand from Industry
Baseline, 2019
NAICS Industrial Sector
Transportation and warehousing
Retail trade
Management of companies and
enterprises
Wholesale trade
Mining
Manufacturing
Other services, except public
administration
Utilities
Administrative and waste
management services
Real estate and rental and leasing
Accommodation and food services
Professional and technical
services
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
Information
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
Construction
Finance and insurance
Educational services
Health care and social assistance

Box
Elder
-8.58%
-8.37%

Davis
-8.17%
-8.85%

Salt
Lake
-13.45%
-12.53%

Utah
-7.17%
-8.61%

Weber
-4.57%
-5.23%

Total
Region
-12.32%
-12.05%

-7.22%
-7.64%
-8.07%
-7.88%

-7.03%
-7.33%
-8.25%
-7.34%

-9.42%
-9.80%
-9.10%
-9.50%

-6.63%
-6.71%
-6.86%
-6.72%

-4.18%
-4.39%
-4.65%
-4.47%

-9.08%
-9.04%
-8.79%
-8.70%

-6.75%
-6.71%

-6.16%
-6.37%

-9.34%
-8.72%

-6.14%
-5.96%

-3.71%
-3.84%

-8.67%
-8.05%

-6.19%
-5.42%
-5.40%

-5.47%
-5.54%
-5.06%

-8.73%
-8.17%
-7.72%

-5.53%
-5.71%
-5.11%

-3.54%
-3.53%
-3.26%

-7.98%
-7.60%
-7.07%

-6.10%
-6.70%
-5.45%
-4.65%
-5.15%
-5.30%
-4.21%
-3.35%

-4.76%
-7.72%
-4.57%
-4.65%
-4.31%
-3.85%
-3.94%
-3.48%

-7.31%
-8.25%
-7.10%
-6.61%
-6.61%
-6.16%
-6.39%
-5.69%

-5.53%
-4.93%
-4.63%
-4.20%
-4.70%
-4.86%
-4.41%
-4.50%

-3.40%
-4.10%
-3.21%
-3.34%
-3.01%
-2.62%
-2.81%
-2.72%

-6.87%
-6.86%
-6.40%
-6.08%
-5.95%
-5.93%
-5.67%
-5.06%

Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model
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3.0 ASSESSING BUSINESS-LEVEL DISASTER
PREPAREDNESS & RECOVERY ACTIONS (PHASE II)
3.1

SURVEY SAMPLING & METHODOLOGY

The objective of Phase II is to identify impact of and response to the recent Coronavirus
pandemic and March 2020 M5.7 Magna earthquake that occurred near Salt Lake City by
the business community in the Wasatch Front, with a focus on the industrial sectors
expected to be worst affected in an M7.0 earthquake scenario (identified through Phase I).
Data was collected through a combination of telephone and online surveys of Salt Lake
City businesses.
The survey sampling began with identifying the top 10 worst-affected industrial sectors
identified in Phase I (see Table 2.6). Then, we downloaded business records for all Salt
Lake City-based businesses within these sectors from the Mergent Intellect database,
which is freely available through the Marriott Library system of the University of Utah. The
Mergent Intellect database contains profile information of each business within the U.S.
including complete contact information for each business. A total of 51,233 businesses
were identified through the Mergent Intellect database (See Table 3.1, Column B). From
this database, the team extracted a stratified sample (Table 3.1, Column C) to match the
proportion of Salt Lake City businesses within the Phase-I top 10 industrial sectors as
reported in the 2021 U.S. Census American Business Survey (Column A). This resulted in
a sample of 3,820 businesses. A survey questionnaire was developed based on previous
literature and studies conducted on the topic by the research team.
Following University of Utah Institutional Review Board requirements for study
recruitment, the project team contacted all 3,280 businesses in the database by phone to
gauge interest in survey participation. A total of 327 businesses agreed to participate in
the survey and provided an email address for further contact. The team then sent an email
to the business with a link to an online survey (administered through Qualtrics). The team
placed reminder phone calls and sent follow-up emails for three consecutive weeks. The
survey process was conducted over a four-month period between November 2021 and
March 2022.

3.1.1 Respondent Business Profile
A total of 130 of the 327 businesses responded to the survey for a response rate of
39.7%. The survey was representative of the percentage distribution in four sectors (see
Table 3.1, Columns D & E). It was overrepresented in the finance and insurance;
administrative, support, waste management, and remediation services; and information
sectors, and underrepresented in the retail trade and the professional, scientific, and
technical services sectors. These over- and underrepresentation are likely to be related to
the continued work-from-home policies in some sectors (such as professional, scientific
and technical services) or to business closures in others (for example, finance and
insurance), which may decrease the likelihood of making first contact for survey
recruitment. Future regression analysis on this dataset will use sample weighting and
other correction techniques to correct this sample response bias (Leeworth et al., 2001).
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The Small Business Association (SBA) classifies small businesses differently for each
NAICS sector, with threshold sizes ranging between 100 and 1,500. Respondent
businesses in our survey had an average of 57.5 employees (median = 6) which implies
that the majority of respondents were small businesses across all NAICS sectors. The
respondents had been in business for an average of 27 years (median = 20.5 years)
which implies they are well-established in the community. Approximately, 18% of
respondents reported being minority-owned businesses and approximately 19% reported
being women-owned.
Table 3.1 Industrial profiles of sampled and respondent businesses
No. of SLC
Composition of Sample
No. of
businesses
Phase-I Top 10
Size
survey
NAICS Industrial
in sampling
industrial
responses
Sector
frame
sectors (%)
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
Manufacturing
2925
8%
305
2
Real estate and rental
4195
10%
382
12
and leasing
Professional, scientific,
10949
26%
993
8
and technical services
Transportation and
2026
5%
191
8
warehousing
Finance and insurance
4684
7%
267
13
Administrative,
support, waste
10640
7%
267
37
management, and
remediation services
Wholesale trade
3105
12%
458
18
Information
2060
4%
152
23
Retail trade
6155
13%
496
2
Construction
4494
7%
267
7
Total
51233
100%
3820
130
Sources: (A) 2021 U.S. American Business Survey; (B) Mergent Intellect, 2021

Survey
responses (%)
(E)
1.54%
9.23%
6.15%
6.15%
10%
28.46%
13.85%
17.69%
1.54%
5.38%
100

3.1.2 Disaster Impact
Overall, most respondent businesses reported being impacted by the COVID-19
pandemic (90%), while about half reported being affected by the March 2020 earthquake
(47%). Among COVID-19-affected business (n = 117), around 59% reported a negative
effect, 23% of businesses reported a positive effect due to the pandemic, and 18%
reported neither a positive nor negative effect. Among earthquake-affected businesses (n
= 61), only 3% of businesses reported positive effects of the disaster on the business,
23% reported a negative effect, and a majority (74%) reported neither positive nor
negative effects. The limited effect of the 2020 March earthquake may be related to its
having occurred in a rural community outside the main urban core and having only
impacted the westside neighborhoods of Salt Lake City and some parts of its downtown.
Due to time and financial constraints, this survey did not cover other cities lying to the
west of Salt Lake City (such as West Valley) where the earthquake had much higher
impact.
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Given the concurrency of both disaster events and the difficulty in isolating their individual
impacts, questions on supply chain and other specific impacts were framed as impacts
from “either COVID-19 or 2020 Earthquake”. A total of 93 out of 130 (71%) surveyed
businesses reported some impact on supply chain management. Of these, 75% (70) SLC
businesses reported having faced domestic or foreign supplier delays due to both
disasters with 37% (34) reporting production delays at the business location, 40% (37)
reporting difficulties in locating alternate suppliers (domestic or foreign), and 56% (52)
reporting having experienced delays in delivery or shipping to customers (see Fig. 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Impact of disasters on supply chain management.

In terms of operating capacity, which is defined as the ability to operate under realistic
operating conditions, 77 of the 130 (59%) survey respondents reported an impact. Of
these, 60% (46) of businesses reported impact on production costs which is in keeping
with the predictions of production-level impact from Phase I of this study (Fig 3.2). In
addition, 56% reported facing labor issues and 47% reported challenges in maintaining
the health and safety of customers and employees. A small percentage of businesses
reported damage to the building and contents due to the earthquake event (12%, 9).
In total, respondents reported having closed doors or remained inactive due to both
disasters for an average of 12 weeks (n = 126), with the maximum reported closure of 72
weeks. About 35% of respondents reported that disasters had negatively affected
business activity, while 23% reported a positive effect on the business (see Fig. 3.3). In
addition, more businesses reported an increase in revenue since the disasters (approx.
50% or 65 respondents) than a decrease (31% or 41 total). This counterintuitive finding of
positive effects from these concurrent disasters may be owed to the overrepresentation of
finance and insurance; real estate, rental and leasing; and, administrative, support, waste
management, and remediation service industries within the survey. These sectors are
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among the ones showing the fastest recovery from the pandemic (Breaux, Fernandez &
Griffis, 2021; McKinsey & Company, 2020).

Figure 3.2. Impact of disasters on business operations

3.1.3 Supply Related Recovery Actions and Future Preparedness
Most surveyed businesses reported having either fully or mostly recovered (68%, 88 nos.)
from the combined effects of the two disasters, which may also be an effect of the sample
bias described in Section 3.1.2. Approximately 24% (32) businesses reported themselves
as still recovering two years after the disasters. This slower recovery trajectory could be
related to the nature of recovery, which typically unfolds over a long duration, and the
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is still ongoing and continues to affect global
supply chains.

Figure 3.3 Impact of disaster on business activity and revenue (n =130)

Approximately 27% (35 total) of respondents reported having identified new suppliers, and
another 14% (18 total) reported having changed their existing suppliers as a recovery
action taken in response to the disasters (see Fig. 3.4). Businesses also reported having
had to take other actions such as adjusting sales and marketing strategy (39%, 51); hiring
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new employees (32%, 42); adjusting capital expenditures for operation (30%, 39); creating
work-from-home policies (29%, 38); and adjusting employee salaries (28%, 36). In specific
reference to supply chain related actions, 14% (18) businesses said they had found new
suppliers outside of their city and 13% (17) had found suppliers within their city. These
results imply that businesses take a wide range of recovery actions, some with immediate
effect (such as adjusting sales strategy or finding new suppliers) and some for which the
effects may only be known in the long term (such as lowering capital expenditures). The
results also suggest that finding alternative suppliers is challenging for impacted
businesses.

Figure 3.4 Recovery actions taken by businesses in response to concurrent disasters (n=130)

Recovery experience seemed to have a raised awareness of disasters within the business
community but did not translate into concrete mitigation or preparedness action.
Approximately 60% (78) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the disaster
experience had prepared them for a future event (see Fig 3.5). However, only 36% (47 out
of 130) reported having undertaken mitigation or preparedness actions and only 23% (30)
reported having a disaster response plan in place before the March 2020 disasters.
The most frequent reported action
was having received consultation on
improvement of business resilience
practice (11 out of 130 respondents)
with another six businesses
reporting having retrofitted their
buildings to withstand earthquakes.
This high awareness but low-action
state indicates that there are more
barriers to business level mitigation
and preparedness than just risk
awareness and these reasons must
be investigated to ensure the
Figure 3.5 Agreement with whether disaster experience
success of business resilience
has helped with future preparedness
programming.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study estimates that the Wasatch Front could experience an economic loss of $6
billion due to road disruption in the aftermath of an M7.0 earthquake on the Salt Lake City
segment of the Wasatch Fault. The study also found that the industrial sectors comprising
the largest share of the Wasatch Front economy (namely and in order, retail; professional,
scientific, and technical services; manufacturing; and finance and insurance) feature in the
top 10 list of worst-affected industries. This indicates a significant economic impact that
will reverberate within Utah’s economy as a whole, and which could influence economic
growth and development for decades to come.
It is important to treat this estimate as a conservative figure since it only reflects effect on
intermediate demand, which forms only one part of the supply chain (final demand being
another). This estimate also does not include other aspects of economic impact, such as
impact to the actual built environment, tax revenue, employment or demand for products
(often calculated by Hazus as direct and indirect loss), nor does it reflect losses due to rail
disruption which is also a mode of supply distribution to the state. Lastly, this estimate only
includes impact supply disruption to the Wasatch Front and not the impact freight traffic
traveling through the state. The latter is of significance because Utah lies at the hub if
seven major freight routes in the country (Braceras and Kuhn, 2017). This implies that the
$6 billion loss estimated by this study is likely to be far exceeded in the event of a high
magnitude earthquake and could affect the entire national economy. This should act as a
call for action to build infrastructure and business resilience in the local communities of the
Wasatch Front. The current Biden-Harris Administration’s emphasis on supply chain
resilience and the 2021 Executive Order 14017 provide support to the need to understand
and address supply chain resilience within the state and the country.
The results of the first phase also call for more inquiry into the current state of businesslevel preparedness and mitigation. To this end, this study conducted a survey of
businesses in Salt Lake City to gauge what their level of preparedness has been and to
understand their behaviors in response to recent disaster events. The study has found
that businesses are impacted by production costs in the aftermath of disasters, which fits
well with the predictions of the first phase of this study that estimates loss to industrial
production due to transportation disruption. The survey also indicates that some
businesses benefit from a disaster and that a likely explanation for this is that their
industrial sectors are likely more resilient, if not direct beneficiaries of the post-disaster
economy (construction or insurance, for instance). The study indicates that businesses
are challenged by supply chain disruptions after disasters, both in terms of supplies
needed to produce goads but also shipping of produced goods. Businesses in this study
tried to diversify their suppliers in the face of concurrent disasters, although not everyone
found suppliers within the local geography. Supply chain management issues combined
with other employee management and lowered production capacity likely provide an
explanation for why a significant proportion of surveyed businesses claim to have still not
recovered from the 2020 disasters two years later. This finding adds to the importance of
needing to focus on long-term community recovery and the role of infrastructure systems
in driving (or inhibiting) this process.
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Importantly, the study found that despite businesses claiming higher awareness of
disaster preparedness and mitigation, few of them actually took concrete actions—to
operations or to the building—to mitigate against future events. This finding points to the
need to better understand and address the structural barriers to businesses adopting
disaster mitigative and preparedness actions. It also points to a general disconnect
between economic development and disaster management practice since there exist
practices with each discipline that could promote business resilience to disasters, but they
are rarely presented together to affected businesses. For example, in Utah, the
Governor’s Office of Economic Development provides help to small businesses to assess
their supply chains, but these services are not automatically coupled with disaster aid
provided to the same business through the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) or the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). At the same time, economic
development institutions rarely emphasize hazard retrofits to business owners despite it
being important to the continued or quick reopening of businesses after disasters.
The study makes the following key recommendations in order to improve infrastructure
and economic resilience within the Wasatch Front:
Increase investment in resilient transportation infrastructure
This research makes a case for strengthening Utah’s road infrastructure to better
withstand a high impact, low probability earthquake—the cost of such improvements is far
likely to be outweighed by the potential benefit in both, a monetary sense as well as in the
sense of protecting Wasatch Front communities. The 2022 Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act presents a significant opportunity for state and local transportation agencies to
make disaster and climate resilience improvements to transportation infrastructure
including bridges and roadways. Hazus scenario data for the Wasatch Region already
identifies the roadway and bridges at highest risk of damage. These combined with social
equity analysis and in keeping with the recent Justice40 Initiative, can act as a guide to
transportation infrastructure improvements within the region. Pre-disaster engineering
improvements to transportation infrastructures are likely to help protect the regional and
Utah economies in the aftermath and allow Utah communities to recover faster.
Improve business resilience practices for high-impact industrial sectors
This study identifies the following industrial sectors as potentially experiencing greater
than $100 million in individual economic loss due to post-earthquake supply disruption:
manufacturing; real estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientific, and technical
services; administrative, support, waste management, & remediation services;
transportation and warehousing; finance and insurance; wholesale trade; information;
retail trade; and construction. These sectors constitute approximately 70% of the Wasatch
Front economy which indicates that impacts to these sectors carry serious repercussions
for the economic growth in the region, if not the state. Additionally, according to the SBA,
over 99% of Utah’s economy comprises of small businesses which often do not have the
knowledge or capacity to undertake preparedness and mitigation activities (SBA, 2021).
These facts highlight the importance of state and local agencies to invest in disaster
education and outreach to businesses in these high-impact sectors. Such outreach may
include education on disaster risk, risk assessments, supply chain assessments, business
interruption insurance, and business continuity planning. As discussed below, some of
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these strategies may already be in place, but disconnected from traditional disaster
planning institutions.
Identify structural barriers to adoption of resilient business
As Phase 2 of this study shows, even when businesses become aware of disaster risk,
they may be unable to undertake concrete disaster preparedness and mitigation actions.
This points to the possibility that something other than risk awareness is at play when it
comes to adoption of resilient practices by businesses, which also calls for further
investigation and alleviating other capacity related such as financial constraints, aid and
resource awareness, and social capital characteristics that could also determine disaster
resilience actions of businesses (Xiao, et al, 2018; Kim & Chandrasekhar, forthcoming).
State and local agencies may also consider including mitigation and preparedness goals
into post-disaster recovery programs which are typically better funded than pre-disaster
programs (Kim & Chandrasekhar, forthcoming). Such programming is more possible
through state and local action because they operate with much greater flexibility than their
federal counterparts Not utilizing the recovery moment to promote future mitigation
represents a significant lost opportunity to promote resilience within the business
community.
Mainstream disaster resilience into economic development
This research also calls for ways to mainstream disaster planning into economic
development practices, particularly those aimed at business and industry development.
Mainstreaming is defined as the process of “looking critically at each (development
program) activity and project that is being planned, not only from the perspective of
reducing the existing risks disaster disasters, but also from the perspective of minimizing
its potential contribution to creation of new risks of disasters” (Chakrabarti, 2017: 7). In
other words, mainstreaming is the act of considering mitigation hazard risk in the process
of development planning and not as an ancillary activity. For economic development, this
means carefully considering which business development strategies are adding to (or, in a
positive sense, mitigating) a business’s disaster risk, and then promoting more resilient
practices. The instruments for such mainstreaming arguably already exist—through tools
for business planning and supply management offered by economic development
institutions on the one hand, and through grant programs for disaster recovery and
mitigation from emergency management institutions on the other. The way forward in this
case is to break the silos within which these communities of practice operate and develop
integrated approaches to resilient economic development, preferably implemented before
disaster strikes.

4.1

STUDY LIMITATIONS

The study’s limitations in Phase 1 are owed mainly to assumptions and choices made
during data translation and processing. Specific examples include the following:
•

Non-inclusion of rail and air transportation disruptions, which limits the study’s
ability to estimate travel delays by these modes.
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•
•

•

•
•
•

Use of Hazus functionality/recovery function instead of damage function to better
reflect the transportation system’s ability to continue operations in the event of a
disaster and because of better fit with link capacity measure in the WF-TDM model.
Assuming that for non-highway bridges, functionality of the road links going through
it or under it would be the same as the bridge. For highway bridges, functionality of
the road link going through the bridge was assumed to be the same as the bridge,
but the road link going under the bridge was assumed to remain unaffected due to
the possibility of re-routing that traffic and the priority given to highways for debris
clearance.
Assuming the advent of recovery phase at Day 30 based on the National Response
Framework, FEMA’s 2017 Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning Guide for Local
Governments and American Planning Association’s 2015 Planning for PostDisaster Recovery: Next Generation (PAS Report 576).
Only including operational costs associated with trucking and not accounting for
value of commodity in the cost of time delay.
Annualizing of cost of delay over a calendar year regardless of date of earthquake.
Trimming the annualized cost scenarios by remove the highest and lowest curves,
which may reduce its accuracy.

The study’s limitations in Phase 2 are owed mainly to survey overrepresentation by quickrecovery industrial sectors, which may have skewed study findings to be more positive
than on ground. The Phase 2 survey was also constrained by time and monetary
considerations, which affected its response rate and limited its geographic scope to one
city in the Wasatch Region.
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APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL APPENDIX
TECHNICAL NOTES
1.1 We also fit curves to the Day 1 and Day 30 delay VHTs, but in most cases the
declines were not realistic, with significant delays still present one year after the
earthquake.
1.2 The equation of the trendline fitting the HAZUS average functionality data was of the
form f(x) = axb + c, where f(x) is the percent nonfunctional on day x and c is a constant.
Setting f(180) = 0 implies c = –a(180)b. Therefore, f(x) = axb – a(180)b. This was run
through the Solver in Excel with the functionality data for Days 1, 3, 7, 14, 30, and 90 to
determine the parameters a and b that minimize the sum of squared errors. To scale to
VHT, we used the exponent b and solved for a when f(1) equals the Day 1 delay VHT
produced by the travel demand model.
1.3 For example, the TSA sector-level direct requirements table has one industry for
natural resources and mining. This is represented by three industries in the 23-sector
REMI PI+ model: forestry, fishing, related activities, and other; mining; and farms. We
used gross output data from the BEA for each of these industries to calculate their shares
of a combined natural resources and mining industry, and used these shares to allocate
the natural resources and mining trucking requirements to the three component industries.

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Custom “Transfer Fields” tool used in geoprocessing of roadways
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Figure 3: Road and Bridge Recovery Curve for Davis County
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Table 1: Queries used in geoprocessing of roadways
File Name
Hazus Highway Segments
TDM Master Network
Query
Query
Master_Fwy

Comment = '1' OR
Comment = '2' OR
Comment = '4'

"FT_2019" > 31 AND
"FT_2019" < 41 AND
"LN_2019" > 0

Master_Art

Comment = '3' OR
Comment = '5' OR
Comment = '6' OR
Comment = '8' OR
Comment = '9'
Comment = '7'

"FT_2019" > 1 AND
"FT_2019" < 20 AND
"LN_2019" > 0

Master_Ramps

FT_2019 = 21 OR
"FT_2019" = 30 OR
"FT_2019" = 31 OR
"FT_2019" = 41 OR
"FT_2019" = 42

Table 2: Queries used to identify roadway links missing in Hazus highway segment inventory
File Name

Query

Master_2020-08-17

FT_2019 <> 1 AND
"LN_2019" > 0 AND
"FunctDay1" = 0 AND
"Flag" < 1 (outside damage area)
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Table 3: Box Elder County Intermediate Demand Impacts by Industry, 2019
(Millions of Dollars)
Change in Share
Intermediate
of Industry
Industry
Demand
Total
Size
Manufacturing
-$49.3 64.2%
25.0%
Real estate and rental and leasing
-$6.2
8.0%
5.6%
Transportation and warehousing
-$6.2
8.0%
7.9%
Wholesale trade
-$3.4
4.5%
2.8%
Construction
-$2.8
3.7%
8.3%
Administrative and waste
management services
-$2.4
3.1%
6.6%
Professional and technical services
-$1.7
2.2%
3.1%
Retail trade
-$1.6
2.1%
11.4%
Other services, except public
administration
-$1.5
1.9%
5.7%
Accommodation and food services
-$0.8
1.0%
6.8%
Utilities
-$0.5
0.7%
0.2%
Mining
-$0.1
0.1%
0.4%
Health care and social assistance
-$0.1
0.1%
8.0%
Finance and insurance
-$0.1
0.1%
3.3%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
$0.0
0.1%
1.9%
Information
$0.0
0.0%
0.6%
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
$0.0
0.0%
0.7%
Management of companies and
enterprises
$0.0
0.0%
0.3%
Educational services
$0.0
0.0%
1.4%
Total
-$76.8
100%
100%
Note: Industry Size represents each industry’s share of total employment in the
county.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model.
Table 4: Davis County Intermediate Demand Impacts by Industry, 2019
(Millions of Dollars)
Change in Share
Intermediate
of Indust
Industry
Demand
Total ry Size
Manufacturing
-$175.7 46.1%
9.3%
Real estate and rental and leasing
-$48.2 12.7%
7.3%
Professional and technical services
-$35.7
9.4%
9.5%
Transportation and warehousing
-$25.8
6.8%
4.7%
Administrative and waste management
services
-$24.8
6.5%
4.9%
Wholesale trade
-$18.4
4.8%
2.1%
Construction
-$13.4
3.5%
8.5%
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Retail trade
-$10.4
2.7% 13.0%
Other services, except public
administration
-$8.9
2.3%
6.6%
Accommodation and food services
-$4.6
1.2%
7.0%
Information
-$4.1
1.1%
1.1%
Finance and insurance
-$3.4
0.9%
6.7%
Utilities
-$2.4
0.6%
0.2%
Health care and social assistance
-$1.6
0.4%
9.7%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
-$1.6
0.4%
3.3%
Mining
-$1.0
0.3%
0.3%
Educational services
-$0.6
0.2%
4.1%
Management of companies and
enterprises
-$0.2
0.1%
1.5%
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
$0.0
0.0%
0.1%
Total
-$381.0
100%
100%
Note: Industry Size represents each industry’s share of total employment in the
county.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model.
Table 5: Salt Lake County Intermediate Demand Impacts by Industry,
2019
(Millions of Dollars)
Change in Share
Intermediate
of Indust
Industry
Demand
Total ry Size
Manufacturing
-$758.0 18.9%
7.3%
Real estate and rental and leasing
-$543.0 13.5%
6.2%
Professional and technical services
-$458.0 11.4%
9.7%
Transportation and warehousing
-$427.9 10.6%
6.0%
Finance and insurance
-$418.5 10.4%
9.3%
Administrative and waste
management services
-$387.2
9.6%
7.7%
Wholesale trade
-$311.5
7.7%
4.2%
Information
-$179.2
4.5%
2.7%
Retail trade
-$110.2
2.7% 10.9%
Construction
-$100.5
2.5%
6.2%
Other services, except public
administration
-$89.4
2.2%
5.2%
Accommodation and food services
-$72.6
1.8%
6.9%
Mining
-$63.0
1.6%
0.5%
Utilities
-$31.3
0.8%
0.2%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
-$22.4
0.6%
2.3%
Management of companies and
enterprises
-$20.6
0.5%
2.2%
Health care and social assistance
-$19.1
0.5%
9.0%
Educational services
-$7.5
0.2%
3.4%
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Forestry, fishing, and hunting
-$0.5
0.0%
0.1%
Total
-$4,020.5
100%
100%
Note: Industry Size represents each industry’s share of total employment in
the county.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model.
Table 6: Utah County Intermediate Demand Impacts by Industry, 2019
(Millions of Dollars)
Change in Share
Intermediate
of Indust
Industry
Demand
Total ry Size
Manufacturing
-$156.2 23.3%
6.7%
Professional and technical services
-$107.8 16.1% 10.6%
Real estate and rental and leasing
-$106.2 15.8%
6.2%
Administrative and waste
management services
-$66.8
9.9%
6.1%
Wholesale trade
-$57.3
8.5%
2.4%
Information
-$52.8
7.9%
4.6%
Retail trade
-$25.4
3.8% 13.5%
Construction
-$22.0
3.3%
9.2%
Other services, except public
administration
-$16.5
2.5%
5.3%
Transportation and warehousing
-$15.5
2.3%
2.0%
Utilities
-$14.0
2.1%
0.2%
Accommodation and food services
-$11.7
1.7%
6.3%
Finance and insurance
-$8.9
1.3%
5.5%
Health care and social assistance
-$4.8
0.7%
9.7%
Educational services
-$2.4
0.4%
7.2%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
-$2.0
0.3%
2.4%
Mining
-$0.6
0.1%
0.3%
Management of companies and
enterprises
-$0.3
0.0%
1.5%
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
-$0.1
0.0%
0.2%
Total
-$671.3
100%
100%
Note: Industry Size represents each industry’s share of total employment in
the county.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model.
Table 7: Weber County Intermediate Demand Impacts by Industry, 2019
(Millions of Dollars)
Change in Share
Intermediate
of Indust
Industry
Demand
Total ry Size
Manufacturing
-$72.8 40.8% 12.4%
Real estate and rental and leasing
-$26.3 14.8%
5.7%
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Administrative and waste management
services
-$16.3
9.2%
8.3%
Professional and technical services
-$13.0
7.3%
6.3%
Wholesale trade
-$11.0
6.2%
3.2%
Transportation and warehousing
-$9.5
5.3%
3.4%
Construction
-$7.4
4.2%
7.4%
Retail trade
-$5.3
3.0% 13.4%
Other services, except public
administration
-$4.3
2.4%
6.3%
Finance and insurance
-$3.3
1.9%
6.9%
Accommodation and food services
-$2.8
1.6%
7.1%
Health care and social assistance
-$1.9
1.0% 12.3%
Utilities
-$1.2
0.7%
0.2%
Forestry, fishing, and hunting
-$1.1
0.6%
0.3%
Information
-$1.0
0.6%
0.9%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
-$0.7
0.4%
2.7%
Mining
-$0.2
0.1%
0.2%
Educational services
-$0.1
0.1%
2.1%
Management of companies and
enterprises
$0.0
0.0%
0.7%
Total
-$178.1
100%
100%
Note: Industry Size represents each industry’s share of total employment in the
county.
Source: Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute analysis using the REMI PI+ model.
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